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1. Introduction
1a. Background and Literature Review
Credit markets in developing countries can be divided into three broad categories:
Formal, Semi-formal, and Informal Credit. Formal credit encompasses what we
know to be conventional sources of credit such as large government and commercial
banks. They tend to require forms of collateral and be governed on a federal or state
level. Informal Credit encompasses individuals. They tend to use non-conventional
forms of collateral such as social collateral to monitor loans. Semi-formal Credit
includes sources that seemingly exhibit traits of both Formal and Informal Credit
such as microcredit or microfinance. Research has largely been focused on the
development of formal credit sources, but only recently has the focus shifted
towards the informal sector.
There are two leading views as to why formal and informal credit markets coexist.
The first is a policy-based explanation that government regulations on the formal
credit market have resulted in the resurgence of an informal credit sector1. The
argument is that in imposing regulations such as interest rate ceilings on the formal
sector the government actually limits the amount of lending that the formal market
is willing to extend to the poor as the low rates prove to be unsustainable2.
Borrowers then turn instead to informal sources of credit that are more accessible
and not restricted by government policies.
The alternative view is that information asymmetry exists for formal lenders
regarding the creditworthiness of individuals. The difference in costs of screening,
monitoring, and contract enforcement across lenders thus leads to fragmentation in
credit markets3. Borrowers then turn to informal sources of credit that do not
require conventional forms of collateral and use other means of monitoring.
Bell et al. 1997; Kochar 1997; Anderson and Malchor-Moller 2006
Tang, et al. 2010
3 Mohieldin, et al. 2000
1
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1b. Research Question
Current understanding of both views is still growing. The aim of this paper is to
contribute to the understanding of the relationship between the formal and informal
markets in Indonesia, and whether there exists any distinct patterns within interest
rate movements.
Indonesia is chosen as the focus of this paper as it boasts one of the most successful
microfinance programs in the world. It has a fairly developed microfinance and
microcredit sector run by large institutions such as Bank Rakyat Indonesia Unit Desa
(BRI-UD) in addition to other government-sponsored semi-formal credit programs
such as Badan Kredit Desa (BKD) and Pembinaan Peningkatan Pendapatan Petaninelayan Kecil (P4K).
BRI-UD has enjoyed much success since its reformation in 1984 and has been
steadily increasing its presence throughout the country. It is formally known as a
Rural Financial Intermediary and works to service low-income rural families in
Indonesia. While it started with a small subsidy in 1984, by the end of 1995 it had
made a profit of about $170 million, was serving about 2.5 million borrowers, and
no longer required a subsidy4. From 2000 to 2007, BRI-UD saw the number of loan
accounts increase by about 30% from 2.7 million to 3.5 million accounts5. Part of its
success stems from an innovative semi-autonomous structure that allows BRI-UD to
operate as an independent profit center. It has also significantly broadened its target
clientele to include the low-income rural population.
Ultimately, the aim of this paper is to find out if amidst this expansion of formal and
semi-formal credit institutions such as BRI-UD, whether there have been significant
changes in interest rate patterns within credit markets in Indonesia, in particular
focusing on changes in the informal credit markets. Should we observe some
difference, the second question would then be to ask why such patterns exist and
develop a greater understanding of potential relationships between factors.

2. Methodology and Results
2a. Data Source
Data regarding specific metrics of creditworthiness and of household credit sources
in Indonesia remains limited. However, the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS) 6
provides a snapshot of a household’s main source of credit and the use of that credit.
Yaron, et al. 1997
Seibel, et al. 2009
6 Conducted by RAND, the center for Population and Policy Studies (CPPS) of the
University of Gadjah Mada and Survey METRE.
4
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The ongoing survey spans multiple years of data collection, with IFLS 1 completed in
1993-4, IFLS2 and 2+ in 1997 and 1998, IFLS3 in 2000, and IFLS4 in 2007-8.
2b. Determining Interest Rates
Data was pulled from the two most recent surveys (IFLS3 and IFLS4) pertaining to
household borrowing history. Monthly Interest Rates were then backed out from
questions bh11, bh20 and bh21 in IFLS47 as well as questions bh14, bh17, bh18 and
bh20 in IFLS38 using the following formulas:
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 =

𝑏ℎ21 − 𝑏ℎ11
𝑏ℎ11

𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 =

𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡
𝑏ℎ20

The mean interest rates were then tabulated against their source and any large
differences examined and further tested for statistical significance.
Monthly Interest Rates

7
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2000

2007

Change (%)

Landlord

0.722%

-15.625%

-16.347%

Money lender

14.799%

13.561%

-1.238%

Arisan

3.607%

2.555%

-1.052%

Government/semi-government bank

2.145%

2.000%

-0.145%

Neighborhood association

2.015%

2.587%

0.572%

Small farmers group (kelompok petani kecil)

1.477%

2.170%

0.693%

Private commercial bank

2.753%

4.129%

1.377%

Office

0.422%

1.999%

1.577%

Shopkeeper

1.000%

3.250%

2.250%

Other

-0.321%

2.722%

3.043%

Cooperative bank

2.080%

5.922%

3.841%

Non-gov't organization

2.446%

6.288%

3.842%

Agricultural bank

0.000%

4.406%

4.406%

Employer

0.830%

126.030%

125.200%

See Figure 3 in Appendix
See Figures 1 and 2 in Appendix
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2c. Robustness Testing for Statistical Significance
T-tests were run on all samples with null hypothesis being no observed change in
the interest rates between previous and current samples. Of note, only cooperative
banks showed a statistically significant increase in interest rates from 2000 to 2007
at the 5% level.
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Equal Variances
Variable 1
0.01844709
0.00270127
528
0.010996779
0
771
-3.297362436
0.000510344
1.646832373
0.001020687
1.963045614

Mean
Variance
Observations
Pooled Variance
Hypothesized Mean Difference
df
t Stat
P(T<=t) one-tail
t Critical one-tail
P(T<=t) two-tail
t Critical two-tail

Variable 2
0.045176489
0.028913719
245

It is interesting to also note that there were no changes for all other loan sources, in
particular that of moneylenders (refer to table below). With the steady expansion of
microbanking units and formal lending sources, the expectation is that some change
be observed as a result of increasing competition and crowd-out. A variety of other
factors however could have contributed to the non-result and thus nothing
conclusive can be stated herewith. However this might prove an interesting
question to pursue and consider with the availability of more data and ability to
isolate variables.
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Equal Variances
Variable 1

Variable 2

Mean

0.146360138 0.1984913

Variance

0.033600588 0.01010786

Observations

61

Pooled Variance

0.02340563

Hypothesized Mean Difference

0

df

106

t Stat

-1.7556551

P(T<=t) one-tail

0.041017998

t Critical one-tail

1.659356034

4

47

P(T<=t) two-tail

0.082035995

t Critical two-tail

1.982597262

3. Discussion
In order to determine potential reasons behind the increase in interest rates of
Cooperative Banks, various aspects of the loan were considered and regressed
against monthly interest. Potential factors considered included the location of the
household (urban vs. rural), the size of the loan, the duration of the loan, and the
purpose of the loan, as well as other contextual and regulatory factors.
3a. Location of the household (Urban vs. Rural)
A t-test was first run on the mean interest rates of those who had borrowed from
cooperative banks in either urban or rural locations to determine if there was a
significant difference between the two. Data was pulled from Book K, question
SC059. Results suggest that there was no significant difference between the two
samples.
. ttest monthly_interest, by (sc05)
Two-sample t test with equal variances
Group

Obs

Mean

1
2

297
169

combined

466

diff

Std. Err.

Std. Dev.

.055749
.0653066

.0097749
.0351798

.168458
.4573372

.0365118
-.0041448

.0749861
.134758

.0592151

.0141764

.3060262

.0313574

.0870729

-.0095576

.0295154

-.067558

.0484428

diff = mean(1) - mean(2)
Ho: diff = 0
Ha: diff < 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.3731

[95% Conf. Interval]

t =
degrees of freedom =
Ha: diff != 0
Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.7462

-0.3238
464

Ha: diff > 0
Pr(T > t) = 0.6269

To further determine the explanatory power of the location of households on
interest rates, a regression of location against monthly interest rates was also run.
Data also suggested that there was almost no correlation between the two,
indicating minimal explanatory power. Thus location was not a factor in why
interest rates might have increased.

9

See Figure 4 in Appendix for relevant question
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3b. Size of the loan
A t-test was first run on the mean size of loans taken out from all the different
sources across the two periods to determine if there was a significant difference
across time. Data was pulled from Book IIIB question BH1410 and Book II question
BH1111.
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Equal Variances
Variable 1
Variable 2
1613550.09
8814540.424
7.55765E+13 7.52281E+14
3331
2125
3.39111E+14
0
5454
-14.08479678
1.39539E-44
1.64513306
2.79079E-44
1.960399039

Mean
Variance
Observations
Pooled Variance
Hypothesized Mean Difference
df
t Stat
P(T<=t) one-tail
t Critical one-tail
P(T<=t) two-tail
t Critical two-tail

The test was then further isolated to encompass only those that had borrowed from
cooperative banks. Results suggest that there had been a significant increase over

10
11

See Figure 1 and 2 in Appendix for relevant question
See Figure 3 in Appendix for relevant question
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time in the size of loans that individuals were taking out overall, as well as from
cooperative banks.
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Equal Variances
Variable 1
Variable 2
923780.7775 3398329.96
3.37248E+12 3.38681E+13
926
494
1.3975E+13
0
1418
-11.88078788
2.10807E-31
1.645928924
4.21614E-31
1.961638359

Mean
Variance
Observations
Pooled Variance
Hypothesized Mean Difference
df
t Stat
P(T<=t) one-tail
t Critical one-tail
P(T<=t) two-tail
t Critical two-tail

To further determine the explanatory power of the size of the loan on interest rates,
a regression of size of loans against monthly interest rates was then run. Data here
suggested that there was very little correlation between the two, indicating minimal
explanatory power. Thus while there had been a significant increase in the size of
loans that people were taking out over time, it was probably not a key factor in why
interest rates might have increased.
. regress monthly_interest bh14
Source

SS

df

MS

Model
Residual

.040836232
3.79072773

1
1241

.040836232
.003054575

Total

3.83156396

1242

.003084995

monthly_in~d

Coef.

bh14
_cons

-3.45e-09
.0217516

Std. Err.
9.44e-10
.0019214

t
-3.66
11.32

Number of obs
F( 1, 1241)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE

P>|t|
0.000
0.000

=
=
=
=
=
=

1243
13.37
0.0003
0.0107
0.0099
.05527

[95% Conf. Interval]
-5.30e-09
.017982

-1.60e-09
.0255212

3c. Duration of the loan
A t-test was first run on the mean duration of loans taken out from all the different
sources across the two periods to determine if there was a significant difference

7

across time. Data was pulled from Book IIIB question BH1712 and Book II question
BH2013.
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Equal Variances
Variable 1
Variable 2
13.34487458 21.62574365
151.0644723 3364.448601
1786
1849
1785.618249
0
3633
-5.906613928
1.90657E-09
1.645273159
3.81315E-09
1.960617177

Mean
Variance
Observations
Pooled Variance
Hypothesized Mean Difference
df
t Stat
P(T<=t) one-tail
t Critical one-tail
P(T<=t) two-tail
t Critical two-tail

The test was then further isolated to encompass only those that had borrowed from
cooperative banks. Results suggest that there had been a significant increase over
time in the duration of loans that individuals were taking out overall, as well as from
cooperative banks.
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Equal Variances
Variable 1
Variable 2
10.92085258 15.56652361
62.28888325 2319.381587
563
466
1084.244197
0
1027
-2.252808979
0.012240803
1.646338683
0.024481606
1.962276567

Mean
Variance
Observations
Pooled Variance
Hypothesized Mean Difference
df
t Stat
P(T<=t) one-tail
t Critical one-tail
P(T<=t) two-tail
t Critical two-tail

To further determine the explanatory power of the duration of the loan on interest
rates, a regression of duration of loans against monthly interest rates was then run.
Data here suggested that there was very little correlation between the two,
indicating minimal explanatory power. Thus while there had been a significant

12
13

See Figure 1 and 2 in Appendix for relevant question
See Figure 3 in Appendix for relevant question
8

increase in the duration of loans that people were taking out over time, it was
probably not a key factor in why interest rates might have increased.
. regress monthly_interest bh17
Source

SS

df

MS

Model
Residual

.083477749
3.74808621

1
1241

.083477749
.003020215

Total

3.83156396

1242

.003084995

monthly_in~d

Coef.

bh17
_cons

-.0011163
.0302024

Std. Err.

t

.0002123
.0028452

-5.26
10.62

Number of obs
F( 1, 1241)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE

P>|t|
0.000
0.000

=
=
=
=
=
=

1243
27.64
0.0000
0.0218
0.0210
.05496

[95% Conf. Interval]
-.0015328
.0246206

-.0006997
.0357843

3d. Purpose of the loan
Data on the purpose of the loans were pulled from Book IIIB question BH1514 and
Book II BH1815. The relationship between the source that households borrowed
from and the purpose for which they borrowed for was then examined further. The
expectation is that there should be some relationship between the two, which is
likely dependent on characteristics and nature of the loans. To simplify
interpretation of the results, the data was further collapsed into broader categories.
The sources of the loans were collapsed into the following categories based on
preexisting designations as defined by Mohieldin and Wright (2000)16. Refer to
Figure 3 in Appendix for an overview of all the loan sources listed within the survey.
i. Formal Lending
Formalized institutions governed on a federal or state level that tends to
require collateral for loans. Encompasses source 1 (Private Commercial
Banks), 2 (Cooperative Banks), 3 (Government / semi-government banks),
and 4 (Agricultural Banks).
ii. Informal Finance at the Corporate Level
This refers to informal finance that takes a corporate form. These may be
family or business partnerships that started by using their own funds for
lending but expanded by accepting deposits in the form of cash certificates
See Figure 1 and 2 in Appendix for relevant question
See Figure 3 in Appendix for relevant question
16 Mohieldin, et al. 2000
14
15
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and cumulative deposits for specified periods. They tend to lend to high-risk
borrowers who do not have access to formal intermediaries and to those
who are geographically remote from formal services17. Encompasses source
14 (Office) and 16 (Non-bank financial institution).
iii. Occasional Lending
This covers all direct intermittent loans by individuals with a temporary
surplus of funds. These tend to be state contingent, with flexible terms and
no collateral requirements18. Encompasses source 5 (Employer), 6
(Landlord), 7 (Shopkeeper), and 8 (Non-government Organizations).
iv. Financing through Collective Agreement
This refers to situations where groups of individuals deposit funds with a
chosen leader. The pooled savings are then lent to group members (or, in
some cases, nonmembers) when they apply for a loan. Members are typically
charged little or no interest. Encompasses source 9 (Neighborhood
Association), 10 (Arisan), and 11 (Small Farmers Group (Kelompok Petani
Kecil).
v. Regular Lending
Similar to occasional lending, these individuals have a surplus of funds but
are more specialized sources that deliberately and specifically function as a
credit source. Encompasses source 13 (Money Lender) and 15 (Pawn Shop).
Similarly, the purposes of the loans were collapsed into the following categories
based on perceived similarity of loan characteristics. Refer to Figure 3 in Appendix
for an overview of all the loan purposes listed within the survey.
i. Lifecycle
This refers to loans that are used to service specific one-off lifecycle-related
ceremonies and proceedings. Loans tend to be consumption-based, fairly
urgent, and may tend to present a temporary income shock to the household.
Encompasses purpose 1 (Birth), 2 (Death), 3 (Marriage), 4 (Dowry), and 5
(Social Ceremony).
ii. Futures Improvement
This refers to loans that are viewed as longer-term investments. Loans tend
to be investment-based with some potential return on investment in the
17
18

Mohieldin, et al. 2000
Mohieldin, et al. 2000
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future to enhance future quality of life, and tend to present less of an income
shock to the household as they are foreseeable. Encompasses purpose 6 (To
buy household goods), 8 (Education), 10 (To buy a house), 13 (To buy land),
17 (To buy / repair Becak), 20 (Material for Cottage Industry), 21 (Capital for
other businesses), and 24 (To help household members, family or friends).
iii. Improvement
This refers to loans that are used for immediate improvement of quality of
life. Loans tend to be consumption-based but should not present a large
income shock to the household. Encompasses purpose 7 (Medication), 9
(Home Renovation), and 25 (To buy or repair vehicle).
iv. Consumption
This refers to loans that are used for immediate consumption. Loans tend to
be fairly urgent in nature, and may serve a consumption-smoothing purpose.
Encompasses purpose 22 (Daily Expenses), 23 (Rotating Credit Association,
Arisan), 26 (Debt Repayment), and 27 (Transport / travel).
v. Futures Improvement (Agricultural)
Similar to futures improvement, this refers more specifically to agriculturalbased activities and related spending. Encompasses purpose 11 (To buy
agriculture inputs), 12 (To buy/repair agriculture equipment), 14 (To buy
cattle), 15 (To buy inputs for poultry), 16 (Fishing Business), 18 (To
buy/repair Boat), and 19 (To buy/repair fishing nets).
A Chi-Square analysis was run on the variables as shown in the contingency table
below to determine the strength of the relationship between them. The Chi-Square
P-value is significant at the 5% level, thus showing an association between source
and purpose of the loan.
As expected, a higher percentage of those that went to formal lending sources to
borrow used that loan for futures investment. Those borrowers seemingly favored
formal lending sources for less urgent, longer-term borrowing purposes.
The converse was also seen as a higher percentage of those that went to informal
lending sources such as regular lending and occasional lending used that loan for
consumption purposes. Those borrowers seemingly favored informal lending
sources for more urgent, shorter-term borrowing purposes.

11

Source of Loan

Formal Lending

Informal
Finance at
Corp Level

Occasional
Lending

Financing
through
Collective
Agreements

Regular
Lending

Total

Lifecycle

58.228% (46)

11.392% (9)

12.658% (10)

7.595% (6)

10.127% (8)

100%

Futures
Investment

73.441% (683)

4.516% (42)

6.559% (61)

6.344% (59)

9.14% (85)

100%

Improvement

69.524% (219)

10.476% (33)

9.524% (30)

5.714% (18)

4.762% (15)

100%

Consumption

44.079% (201)

5.263% (24)

14.693% (67) 19.298% (88) 16.667% (76) 100%

Futures
Investment
(Agriculture)

65.116% (84)

2.325% (3)

10.853% (14)

14.729% (19)

Total

64.589% (1233)

5.815% (111)

9.534% (182)

9.953% (190) 10.110% (193) (1909)

Chi-Square
P-value

1.76389E-29

Purpose of
Loan

6.977% (9)

100%

Having established a relationship between source and purpose of loan, a regression
was then run with purpose of loan against monthly interest to determine the
potential effect of a shift in borrowing purposes over time on monthly interest. Data
here however suggested that there was very little correlation between the two,
indicating minimal explanatory power. Thus while there exists a relationship
between the source and purpose of the loan, this relationship does not seem to
affect the change in interest rates that we have observed.
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3e. Other Contextual and Regulatory Factors
Given that there seems to be a lack of any quantifiable factors present within the
loan structure that might be able to explain the increase in interest rates charged by
Cooperative Banks, other external factors related to context and the general
economic environment in Indonesia should also be considered.
Macroeconomic Environment in Indonesia
While economically stable in the year 2000, Indonesia was still in a state of recovery
following the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis. Government and commercial
banks survived, and interest rates on loans issued such as that of KUPEDES
(“General Rural Credit”) by the BRI, had returned to pre-crisis levels19. There are
multiple possible scenarios and explanations for why we observe an increase in
interest rates as charged by Cooperative Banks, but there are two that seem most
probable.
Overall, it is possible that the rates observed in 2000 are actually artificially
depressed in the wake of the financial crisis. It is possible that what we observe to
be an increase from 2000 to 2007 is an increase in rates back to normal. It is thus
likely that based on the nature of cooperatives, the depression in rates was
deliberately done for the benefit of borrowers, to expand lending and ease the
impact of the credit freeze on households. Goglio and Alexopoulos (2013) suggest
that credit cooperatives may be less prone to raising the loan rate during periods of
financial stress20, thus it is possible that cooperatives deliberately depressed
interest rates for the benefit of borrowers.
It is also possible that the downturn forced cooperatives to lower lending rates in
order to increase demand and encourage consumers to continue borrowing from
them. Seibel and Ozaki (2009) propose that the number of borrowers utilizing
microbanking units actually fell in 1998 and 1999 from a decrease in demand
related to a cautious attitude among the poor concerning an uncertain future 21. Thus
another potential explanation is that cooperatives adjusted their lending rates to
meet the overall decrease in demand for credit.
Decrease in demand
Data from the survey further indicates that between 2000 and 2007 there seems to
be a decrease in demand for loans from Cooperative Banks. Thus while inconclusive,
it is possible that there exists some relationship between the overall demand and
change in interest rates observed. The percentage of respondents that went to
Cooperative Banks for a loan declined over time as shown in the table below.
Patten, et al. 2011
Goglio, et al. 2013
21 Yaron, et al. 1997
19
20
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% of respondents that went to source

2000

2007

Change in %

Private commercial bank

4.68%

11.67%

6.99%

Government/semi-government bank

19.70%

25.63%

5.93%

Other

3.09%

5.76%

2.67%

Money lender

5.61%

7.54%

1.93%

Office

1.95%

3.70%

1.75%

Small farmers group (kelompok petani kecil)

1.05%

1.50%

0.45%

Shopkeeper

1.26%

1.50%

0.24%

Agricultural bank

0.06%

0.28%

0.22%

Landlord

0.24%

0.28%

0.04%

Non-gov't organization

6.81%

3.37%

-3.44%

Neighborhood association

7.98%

4.50%

-3.48%

Arisan

7.23%

3.51%

-3.72%

Cooperative bank

27.77%

23.20%

-4.57%

Employer

12.44%

3.66%

-8.78%

Don’t Know

0.15%

It should be noted however that the question itself relates only to the largest loan
that a household has taken out in the last 12 months. Hence it is possible that overall
demand has not changed, rather it is due to the fact that some responses are not
captured within the scope of this survey.

4. Conclusion
In conclusion, this paper aimed to develop a better understanding of any interest
rate changes within the informal credit markets in Indonesia. Overall, results
indicate that there has been no change for interest rates across the different loan
sources from 2000 to 2007 based on borrower responses, the only exception being
that of Cooperative Banks. Results show that there is a steady increase in interest
rates as charged by Cooperative Banks from 2000 to 2007 in Indonesia. However,
there was a lack of explanatory factors that might help to illuminate the reason for
this increase. Thus it is likely that potential macroeconomic factors are the cause of
this increase.

5. Further Research
Going forward but beyond the scope of this paper, questions that deserve further
examination include the lack of change in interest rates observed and the resulting
14

effect of the presence of formal credit institutions on informal credit institutions.
Does introducing formal credit sources to underserved communities directly affect
the behavior of preexisting informal credit sources in those locations?
An empirical analysis and isolation of factors involving the introduction of formal
credit institutions into certain locations might help to better elucidate the effect of
introducing a formal credit institution into an underserved community. In a survey
studying the unbanked in Indonesia, Johnston and Morduch (2008) found that while
roughly 40 percent of poor households in Indonesia were judged creditworthy by
the criteria set out by Bank Rakyat Indonesia’s microfinance unit, fewer than 10
percent of poor households had actually borrowed from a formal bank or a
registered microfinance bank. It suggests that there is still a large underserved
population that exists within Indonesia, and more can still be done to test the direct
implications of expanding access to such formal sources.
Ultimately, the goal would then be to understand if the expansion of formal sources
does in fact phase out the use of informal sources, and whether the adoption of
formal credit is then a question of sustainability or accessibility.

15
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